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E.U. CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN
AN EVOLVING EUROPEAN UNION
Jo Shaw*
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, responding to an emerging debate led by the Heads of State and
Government of the Member States of what was then the European
Communities about the development of special rights for "European
citizens," the European Commission articulated what at the time seemed a
daring proposition for the development of E.U. law: "[C]omplete
assimilation with nationals as regards political rights is desirable in the long
term from the point of view of a European Union."'
By the mid-2000s, the European Communities had evolved into a
"European Union" of sorts, but the "complete assimilation" of nationals of
other Member States with the nationals of the host state in relation to
political rights, as postulated by the Commission, had not been achieved.
E.U. citizens continue to have rather limited rights to vote and stand in
elections in the Member States where they are resident, if they lack the
nationality of that state. In particular, citizens of the E.U. Member States
have no rights under E.U. law to vote in national or regional 2 elections in
the state in which they are resident. This stands in sharp contrast to the
situation in the United States, where the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment grants U.S. citizens the citizenship of the state in
which they reside. Through this guarantee flows the right to vote in state-
* Salvesen Chair of European Institutions, School of Law, University of Edinburgh. This
essay is a development of one section of Chapter Six of Jo Shaw, The Transformation of
Citizenship in the European Union (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2007).
1. Commission of the European Communities, Towards European Citizenship, point
3.1, COM (75) 321 final (July 2, 1975) (emphasis added), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/5572/01/002205-2.pdf.
2. The term "regional elections" is used here to denote elections to representative
bodies at the substate level. However, it is a problematic term, because the extent of powers
held at the "regional" level varies substantially across the Member States. There are several
federal or quasi-federal states in the European Union (including Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Spain, and the United Kingdom). In all these cases, the regional authorities exercise some
sovereign state powers, guaranteed by constitution, or by constitutional convention (United
Kingdom). However, there are considerable variations across these five states, and indeed in
some cases (Spain and the United Kingdom), within them. Other states have more limited
devolution arrangements, especially for distinctive or peripheral regions (e.g., the Azores
within Portugal). In other cases, "regional" elections effectively involve another tier of local
or municipal government (e.g., counties or similar units of government), and the elected
bodies have relatively few autonomous powers.
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level elections. Though never stated explicitly in the European Union's
founding treaties, E.U. law, like the U.S. Constitution, guarantees the right
of "its" citizens to vote in "federal" elections-in this case, European
Parliamentary elections held every five years. 3
This essay examines the emergence of political rights for nonnationals in
the context of the development of the European Union, with a particular
focus upon the question of E.U. citizens voting in national and regional
elections in the Member States in which they reside but of which they do
not hold nationality. It reviews first the development of "European Union"
and what that means in political and constitutional terms, and then moves
on to review the different mechanisms which could be applied to enhance
the political rights of E.U. citizens.
I. A EUROPEAN UNION WITHOUT POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The adoption and entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993
inaugurated a European Union, based on the three "pillars" of E.U. policy:
the European Communities; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP);
and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) (formerly
Justice and Home Affairs). The original base of the European Communities
in the field of economic integration and "market-building" was gradually
deepened through innovations such as the Economic and Monetary Union
and complemented through the continued development of flanking policies,
such as those concerned with social affairs, the labor market, and
environmental questions. It has also been extended into a much broader
portfolio of activities covering many matters of foreign policy and internal
security policy, historically central to the sovereign identity of the Member
States as nation states.
The concept of "European citizens" has also become a legal reality since
1975. The Treaty of Maastricht instituted a formal notion of "citizenship of
the Union." 4 E.U. citizens are those persons holding the nationality of the
Member States. 5 Therefore, through their systems of nationality laws, the
Member States serve as gatekeepers of access to E.U. citizenship by
nonnationals. The package of "citizenship" rights introduced by the Treaty
of Maastricht was largely limited to codifying the existing range of rights
for nationals of the Member States, under the free movement rules
contained in articles 39, 43, and 49 EC 6 and the right to nondiscrimination
on grounds of nationality, enshrined in article 12 EC.7
3. See Opinion of First Advocate Gen. Tizzano, Case C-145/04, Spain v. United
Kingdom; Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. College van burgemeester en wethouders
van Den Haag, Apr. 6, 2006, 67-68, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004C0 145 :EN:HTML.
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 17,
Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
5. Id.
6. Id. arts. 39, 43, 49.
7. Id. art. 12.
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Since 1993, the Court of Justice has pushed the margins of E.U.
citizenship gradually outwards, concluding that the right to reside in the
Member States guaranteed by article 18 EC 8 is directly effective and is
therefore enforceable by individual citizens in the national courts against
the public authorities of the Member States. Member States may place only
proportionate restrictions upon E.U. citizens' right of residence, even with
respect to those persons who are not economically active.9 The range of
coverage provided the nondiscrimination principle-which was historically
linked to the applicant carrying out some form of economic activity in
another Member State,' 0 even if this only involved being a tourist' '-has
been extended so that the applicant need no longer show an economic
nexus. 12 Now, this range has been extended so that the applicant need no
longer show an economic nexus. The equal treatment rights of students
moving within the single market have been substantially increased. 13
Professor Dora Kostakopoulou has argued that European citizenship has not
been the purely symbolic institution which many initially expected it to
be. 14 Instead, it has evolved, in the hands of the Court of Justice in
particular, in very significant ways beyond the confines of a concept of
market citizenship to become both a more political and a more
institutionalized figure.' 5
One element of the original citizenship package of 1993 already ventured
into political territory. Article 19 EC grants electoral rights (the right to
vote and the right to stand) to E.U. citizens in relation to local and European
Parliamentary elections. 16 E.U. citizens resident in a Member State other
than the one in which they hold nationality may vote and stand in local and
European Parliamentary elections in their Member State of residence,
broadly under the same conditions as nationals. 17 The equal treatment
principle laid down in article 19 EC was elaborated and implemented in two
directives adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1993 and 1994.18 These
8. Id. art. 18.
9. Case C-200/02, Chen v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9925; Case
C-413/99, Baumbast & R v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091, 1-7125-33.
10. Case C-168/91, Konstantinides v. Stadt Altensteig, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1191.
11. Case 186/87, Cowan v. Le Trrsor public, 1989 E.C.R. 195.
12. Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v. Etat Beige, 2003 E.C.R. 1-11613; Case C-85/96,
Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2691.
13. Case C-209/03, R, exparte Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, 2005 E.C.R. 1-2119;
Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve,
2001 E.C.R. 1-6193. For commentary, see Michael Dougan, Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole
Cheques: Who Covers the Costs of Migrant Education Within the EU?, 42 Common Market
L. Rev. 943 (2005).
14. Dora Kostakopoulou, Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining
Institutional Change, 68 Mod. L. Rev. 233 (2005).
15. Id.
16. EC Treaty art. 19.
17. Id.
18. Council Directive 94/80, 1994 O.J. (L 368) 38 (EC) ("laying down detailed
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal
elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not
2007] 2551
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
electoral rights are somewhat restricted in nature, and also have been rather
limited in their impact (e.g., in the rates of participation of voters and the
visibility of nonnational candidates).1 9 Nonetheless, they are symbolically
important, as they represent an encroachment by the European Union as a
political union into traditionally protected areas of national sovereignty,
which are concerned with the organization of the political system on a
democratic basis. While the rights were granted on a top down basis, as a
result of the collective will of the Member States expressed in amendments
to the EC Treaty, they are dependent for their impact upon their
implementation and practical application at a national, subnational, and
often local level by the authorities of the Member States with responsibility
for electoral matters.
These rights benefit the relatively small, but significant, number of
citizens of the Member States resident in a state other than that in which
they hold nationality. Prior to the 2004 European Parliament elections, and
with an eye already to the impact of the 2004 enlargement,20 the European
Commission estimated that there were around 6.5 million "Community
voters" in the European Union. 21 This term refers to those who are eligible
to vote, but are resident outside their Member State of nationality, and who
are covered by the equal treatment guarantee in article 19 EC. The total
population of the twenty-five E.U. Member States in 2006 was over 460
million,22 but this includes persons not eligible to vote for reasons such as
age. A figure of around 1.5 percent of E.U. citizens resident in other
Member States is frequently cited,23 and this figure has been relatively
stable for a number of years. To put these figures in context, it is worth
noting that 6.5 million "Community voters" would outnumber the electorate
in more than a third of those small and medium-sized European states
which are E.U. Member States. 24 At the same time, the vast majority of
nationals"); Council Directive 93/109, 1993 O.J. (L 329) 34 (EC) ("laying down detailed
arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the
European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are
not nationals").
19. Shaw, supra note *, chs. 4, 5.
20. Inevitably, the figures do not anticipate the additional mobility which has occurred
since May 2004, particularly from some new Member States, such as Poland, Latvia, and
Lithuania, to Member States which have maintained an open labor market, such as Ireland
and the United Kingdom.
21. Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs (EC), Working Paper: EP Elections
in 2004, Number of Community Voters under Directive 93/109/EC in the 2004 EP Elections,
JAI.C.3/SAS/2004-1 (Mar. 23, 2004).
22. Giampaolo Lanzieri, Population in Europe 2005: First Results, in Statistics in
Focus: Population and Social Conditions 3 tbl. 1 (Eurostat, No. 16/2006, Nov. 2006).
23. Obviously some instabilities have arisen as a result of the substantial enlargements
of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, especially since these are coupled with many
restrictions on the free movement of labor from the new Member States. However, the
figure of 1.5 percent has been remarkably enduring over thirty years.
24. Potential "Community voters" outnumber the electorate not only in the three micro-
states (Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus), but also in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland,
Denmark, Finland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
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those voters are excluded from those forms of democratic participation
which are not covered by article 19 or by national law. This is because,
with the exception of certain rights granted under national law in Ireland
and the United Kingdom, E.U. citizens are not given rights to vote for
representatives elected to parliaments or assemblies at the national,
substate, or regional level (e.g., the Lander in Germany or the autonomous
communities in Spain). It is ironic that while the European Union exists in
part to encourage mobility between the Member States, it gives rise at the
same time to a structural "citizenship deficit," in that those persons who do
exercise mobility rights are excluded from full democratic membership of
the state of residence unless they take on the national citizenship of the host
state. Indeed, the very essence of E.U. law on mobility since the Union's
inception has been to create a legal framework which blurs the distinction
between intrastate and interstate mobility within the single market for the
citizens of the Member States and to remove the need for mobile E.U.
citizens to acquire the citizenship of the host state. This is not least because
mobile E.U. citizens might well envisage multiple acts of mobility during
their lifetime, perhaps moving successively for educational, employment,
family, and lifestyle reasons. This "citizenship deficit" persists despite the
fact that the European Union has recently instituted a form of permanent
residence which Member States must guarantee under the 2004 Citizens'
Rights Directive to those nationals of other Member States who have been
resident for more than five years in the host state. 25 However, this status of
permanent residence does not give access to any additional political rights
beyond those guaranteed in article 19 EC.
Discussions of E.U. electoral rights need to be nested within a variety of
intellectual and political, legal, and constitutional contexts. One such
context, which takes on the challenge of the European Commission's
bluesky thinking of 1975 in relation to the allocation of political rights
across the Member States of the European Union in the context of a
political union, is provided by the gradual evolution of the European
Union's constitutional framework.
This is not the forum to rehearse in full the arguments regarding the
European Union's constitutional past, present, and future. Suffice it to say
at this stage that there exists a symbiotic relationship between two reference
points for constitution building in the European Union. 26 On the one hand,
there exists what one may term the European Union's gradually evolving
informal constitutional framework, which is a composite structure based on
the existing treaties, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice and
other political and legal actors. This composite constitutional structure
enshrines both the rules according to which the European Union operates
and the underlying political and ideological values and structures which
25. Council Directive 2004/38, art. 16, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 106 (EC).




infuse these rules.27 On the other hand, the European Union has been
engaged actively since 2000-thus far unsuccessfully-in the attempt to
sponsor the drafting and adoption of a more encompassing and unitary
documentary constitution for the European Union. This began with the
Declaration on the Future of the Union appended to the Treaty of Nice,
which recognized the unsatisfactory nature of the Intergovernmental
Conference (IGC) which concluded in December 2000 and some of the
future challenges facing an enlarging European Union. Eventually, after the
work of the Convention on the Future of the Union and a further IGC had
been concluded in 2004, that phase of the process concluded with the
signature by the Member States of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for the European Union ("Constitutional Treaty") in October 2004.28
However, signature merely signaled the beginning of the ratification
process. It seems extremely unlikely under current conditions that the
Constitutional Treaty will ever come into force, given that it was rejected in
popular referendums in France and the Netherlands in mid-2005. With the
ratification process stalled indefinitely, the Constitutional Treaty itself
seems to exist in limbo.
The Constitutional Treaty was very much a hybrid document. It draws
very heavily upon the resources offered by the existing informal
constitutional framework, while at the same time innovating in a number of
important areas, especially in relation to institutional design. Had the
Constitutional Treaty come into force as originally scheduled on November
1, 2006, it would have been impossible to understand the future
arrangements without frequent and detailed reference back to what had
gone before because of the symbiotic relationship that would exist between
the "new" and the "old" E.U. constitutionalism.29
With the possibility of a documentary constitutional framework for the
European Union now blocked for the foreseeable future, it is likely that
Member States and the E.U. institutions will pursue other avenues of
constitutional development. 30 On the other hand, some observers suggest
that the entire constitution-building enterprise has been an unnecessary
distraction for what remains in essence a limited exercise in international
cooperation between sovereign states guaranteed already by a sufficiently
27. Neil Walker, The White Paper in Constitutional Context (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Jean
Monnet Ctr., Working Paper No. 6/01, 2001), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011001.html.
28. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16,
2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 [hereinafter Constitutional Treaty].
29. Jo Shaw & Jean Monnet, Legal and Political Sources of the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, 55 N.I.L.Q. 214 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech to the Friends of Europe Foundation and the
Robert Schuman Foundation (Sept. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.demyc.org/fruitbasket/index.php?download=658.pdf (putting forth a proposal for
a mini-treaty by French Interior Minister and presidential candidate of the right).
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diverse and effective range of legitimation mechanisms. 31  The
constitutional promoters can, however, probably muster the larger number
of voices speaking in favor of further developments on the constitutional
and/or the treaty reform front. Some of that reforming energy has been
diverted into consideration of the possibility of concluding a type of
"Constitutional-Treaty-lite," or a "Nice Treaty bis," which might garner
sufficient support at the national level and which would not necessarily
need ratification via referendum. The focus in these proposals has been
primarily upon minimal institutional reform to smooth the ongoing effects
of both the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and possible future
enlargements.32 A limited number of observers call for the resurrection of
the Constitutional Treaty itself,33 albeit sometimes in a revised form.34 The
European Commission has tended to avoid too many shrill pronouncements
on the Constitutional Treaty, for fear of alienating opinion in the national
capitals. However, most individual commissioners who have expressed an
opinion are supportive of the Constitutional Treaty 35 and concerned about
the implications of potentially "watering it down" in order to achieve
acceptance. Perhaps the best view is to take a longer-term perspective. 36
Some commentators have pointed out that over a period of years, or even
decades, the most enduring and effective ideas put forward in documents
such as the Constitutional Treaty or the earlier Draft Treaty of European
Union elaborated by the first directly elected Parliament after 1979, tend to
be incorporated into the European Union's legal and constitutional
structure.37 To put it another way, if what is in the Constitutional Treaty
would "work" in an E.U. context, then it will be picked up again in future
reforms, probably piecemeal, over a period of years.
However, none of these proposals directly addresses the ongoing
challenges faced by the Union as a political union of citizens, which is what
the Commission was referring to back in 1975 with its "complete
31. See Andrew Moravcsik, What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European
Constitutional Project?, 47 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 219 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Janis A. Emmanouilidis & Almut Metz, Renewing the European Answer,
EU-Reform 2006/2 (C.A.P., Bertelsmann Stiftung, Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/spotlight/Reformspotlight_02-06_en.pdf
33. European Socialists Set to Relaunch Constitution, EurActiv, Oct. 24, 2006,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/constitution/european-socialists-set-relaunch-constitution/article
-159040 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
34. Andrew Duff, Plan B: How to Rescue the European Constitution (Notre Europe,
Studies and Research, No. 52, 2006).
35. See, e.g., Marc Beunderman, Commissioners Reject Sarkozy Mini Treaty Plan,
EUObserver, Nov. 22, 2006, http://euobserver.com/18/22932; Margot Wallstr6m, Vice
President of the European Comm'n Responsible for Institutional Affairs and Commc'n
Strategy, The Consequences of the Lack of a European Constitution, Presentation to the
Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (Nov. 22, 2006) (transcript
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/73 1 &type
=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr).
36. See also Shaw, supra note 26, at 150-5 1.
37. Philippe de Schoutheete, Scenarios for Escaping the Constitutional Impasse,
Europe's World, Summer 2006, at 74.
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assimilation" call. Indeed, the Constitutional Treaty itself largely ignored
the question of the structural citizenship deficit highlighted in this paper,
although it did address some issues related to democracy. Part I of the
Constitutional Treaty included a title on democracy, quaintly headed "the
democratic life of the Union." 38 This included interesting innovations such
as citizens' initiatives, whereby a million citizens from a significant number
of Member States may sign a petition and submit it to the Commission to
consider making a proposal in a field where citizens think there should be
Union action.39 However, the Constitutional Treaty's provisions were
limited to addressing the role of the principles of participatory and
representative democracy regarding the functioning of the Union's
institutions, and the policy-making endeavors of the Union itself, not the
Member States. Moreover, the Constitutional Treaty does not provide for
the development of the concept of Union citizenship. Instead, it
reproduces, by and large, the existing provisions of the EC Treaty.
The lack of attention to democracy in any respect other than in relation to
the Union's own institutions is, at one level, hardly surprising. It is
certainly not for the Union to tell the Member States how their democratic
systems should be developed, even though being a functioning liberal
democracy is undoubtedly a condition for accession to the Union.40
Moreover, it should be recalled that back in 1993 the Treaty of Maastricht
did partially reshape the democratic institutions of the Member States by
adding several million "Community voters" to the rosters of the Member
States for local elections, and by offering E.U. citizens the possibility of
being elected to local councils in their place of residence. However,
limitations upon those local electoral rights manifested themselves from the
very beginning, in order to permit the Member States to resist too much
encroachment upon their national sovereignty. Under article 5(3) of the
Local Elections Directive, Member States were permitted to lay down that
"only their own nationals may hold the office of elected head, deputy or
member of the governing college of the executive of a basic local
government unit if elected to hold office for the duration of his mandate. '41
Furthermore, article 5(4) provides that "Member States may also stipulate
that citizens of the Union elected as members of a representative council
shall take part in neither the designation of delegates who can vote in a
38. Constitutional Treaty tit. VI.
39. Id. art. 1-47(4). In an example of the peremptory application of the Constitutional
Treaty, an online petition arguing for the relocation of the European Parliament's seat solely
in Brussels, and away from Strasbourg and Luxembourg, garnered more than one million
signatures, before it was presented to the E.U. institutions. See The European Parliament
should be located in Brussels, http://www.oneseat.eu/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). Its chances
of success are minimal, however, because of the complex politics associated with the
location of the E.U. institutions-a veritable Pandora's box which the Member States are
reluctant to reopen, whatever the costs of the current complex and unwieldy arrangements.
40. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, art. 6(1), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5;
id. art. 49.
41. See Council Directive 94/80, supra note 18, art. 5(3).
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parliamentary assembly nor the election of the members of that
assembly." 42
However, the fact that the EU, at its present stage of integration, has not
been vested with the relevant powers to develop a comprehensive federal
vision of political citizenship does not completely frustrate other citizenship
initiatives. Indeed, there is no reason why there should not be
developments in relation to the constitutionalization of rights of E.U.
citizens that are derived from national sources, rather than from sources
within European Union law which rely upon the Union institutions. The
sources of constitutional law necessary to sustain a multilevel polity such as
the European Union have never in practice been confined to those rooted
directly in the supranational entity itself, but also have stemmed in different
ways from national law and national institutions.43 To operate effectively,
the European Union relies upon the administrative systems and procedural
laws of the Member States, and there is no reason why constitutional
development could not be seen as fostered by measures taken at the national
level, whether autonomously or in response to a collective initiative which
the Member States choose to take outside the confines of the current
integration framework.
The reason for making this argument is that there is no foreseeable
possibility that the Member States will change the E.U. treaties to include a
provision akin to article 19 EC that covers elections for national and
subnational parliaments and assemblies within the Member States,
presidential elections (or similar), and referendums. However, there is
already in place a patchwork of electoral rights for E.U. citizens, which
does extend a little beyond that which is mandated by the treaties as they
stand, notably in Ireland and the United Kingdom. Potentially, that
patchwork could be developed in the future, and this essay explores some of
the pathways that policy makers and legislators at a number of different
levels could take to achieve the goal articulated by the Commission back in
1975.
II. ELECTORAL RIGHTS FOR E.U. CITIZENS IN REGIONAL AND NATIONAL
ELECTIONS?
There is some popular support for the electoral rights of E.U. citizens to
be extended within the Member States. In 2006, a Eurobarometer survey
showed considerable support within many Member States for the premise
that one of the best ways to strengthen European citizenship could be
instituting the right for E.U. citizens to vote in all elections in the Member
42. Id. art. 5(4)
43. For a fully elaborated example of how this interplay can work in the context of the
mandate given to national courts to act as "European courts" within the EU's multilevel




State in which they are resident.44 Reflecting these concerns, the question
whether E.U. citizens should have voting rights in regional and national
elections has been a consistent theme in written questions posed by
Members of the European Parliament to European Commissioners. For
example, in a reply to a question about U.K. citizens losing voting rights in
national elections after fifteen years outside the United Kingdom, without
acquiring them in the host state, 45 Commissioner Antonio Vitorino
commented,
The right to vote of own nationals of a Member State in elections of that
Member State belongs fully to the competence of the Member States,
independent of whether those citizens reside in its territory or outside of
its territory. This is explicitly confirmed in the relevant Directives
93/109/EC (1) and Directive 94/80/EC (2), which provide that nothing in
those Directives affects each Member State's provisions concerning the
right to vote or to stand as a candidate of its nationals who reside outside
of its territory.
Because of the lack of the competence the Commission does not plan to
take any actions relating to the right to vote of nationals of a Member
State residing outside of its territory.46
Notwithstanding this negative conclusion about the possibility of
regulating expatriate voting, the Commission did devote some attention to
the question of regulating the rights of mobile E.U. citizens in the host state
in its Fourth Report on Citizenship of the Union in 2004, raising the matter
initially for the Member States' attention. The Commission noted with
regret,
Recurrent petitions, parliamentary questions and public correspondence
reveal the concerns of many Union citizens regarding a gap in electoral
rights at the present level of Community law: Union citizens may still be
deprived of important civic rights as a result of the exercise of the right to
free movement, namely the right to participate in national or regional
elections. The Member States do not grant electoral rights at national or
regional elections to nationals of other Member States residing in their
territory.47
44. Special Eurobarometer, No. 251, The Future of Europe 45-46 (May 2006), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_25 l-en.pdf.
45. Voting by expatriates from the United Kingdom was originally introduced with a
limit set at five years by the Representation of the People Act, 1985, c. 50, § 1. This was
increased to twenty years in the Representation of the People Act, 1989, c. 28, § 2, and then
reduced once more to fifteen years by § 141 of the Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41.
46. Written Question E-1301/02 by Michael Cashman (PSE) to the Commission
Regarding Voting Rights of EU Citizens, 2003 O.J. (E 92) 44.
47. Fourth Report on Citizenship of the Union (1 May 2001-30 April 2004), at 8-9,
COM (2004) 695 final (Oct. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Fourth Report on Citizenship] (emphasis
omitted); see also EUROPA, European Year of Workers' Mobility 2006,
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This comment about recurrent complaints on this matter, it should be
noted, is in stark contrast to the Commission's statement in other reports
that it has received few complaints over the years about the workings of the
right to vote in local elections.48 The lack of complaints in the latter area
could suggest that these work well; it could also provide a message about
the comparative salience of local and national elections for voters, and
specifically for voters who find themselves resident in a Member State
other than the one of which they are a national. What "special rights"-to
reapply the terminology of the early citizenship debates from the 1970s in
the European Communities-need to be granted for there to be effective
integration of mobile E.U. citizens into the host state? "Complete
assimilation as regards political rights" was the solution according to the
Commission, and it would seem that some of the feedback to the
Commission from disgruntled E.U. citizens does indeed echo that point.
In its conclusion to the Fourth Report, the Commission returned to the
same topic, commenting however that "decisions concerning possible
measures to be adopted under Article 22(2) of the EC Treaty still require
careful consideration. '49 Article 22 allows for amendments to be adopted
to the EC Treaty's citizenship provisions using a truncated amendment
procedure which avoids the need for a full intergovernmental conference,
but still requires any amendments to be ratified by all the Member States
following a unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers, as with all
amending treaties. The Commission has yet to make use of its power of
proposal in article 22, and while it is conceivable that it might make such a
proposal, it would be highly unlikely that any such proposal would garner
the necessary unanimous support in the Council of Ministers at the present
time, especially if it concerned the sensitive question of political rights. It
is notable that since 1993 and the institution of E.U. citizenship, the
provisions have already been amended in small ways twice-by the
Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice.50 However, in both cases the provisions
http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/workersmobility.2006/index.cfm?idpage= 140 (last
visited Feb. 6, 2007) (listing personal, but wholly anonymous, "testimonies of people who
have had first hand experience of living and working in another EU country").
48. Commission Report on the Application of Directive 94/80/EC on the Right to Vote
and Stand as a Candidate in Municipal Elections, at 7, COM (2002) 260 final (May 30,
2005).
49. Fourth Report on Citizenship, supra note 47, at 11.
50. The Treaty of Amsterdam added a phrase to article 17(1): "Citizenship of the Union
shall complement and not replace national citizenship." Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain
Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 27. This was part of a set of trade-offs
between Denmark and the other Member States. In part it was retrospective in nature, as the
phrase is drawn from the 1992 Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council which
followed the first (failed) Danish referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht, and was agreed to
as part of a package to persuade the Danish government and political elite to try, once more,
to "sell" the Treaty to the electorate. In terms of the Treaty of Amsterdam itself, it was also
part of a complex trade-off related to the incorporation of Schengen within the framework of
the E.U. Treaties, which included also an "opt-out" for Denmark in relation to the nature of
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adopted formed part of a larger trade-off between the Member States,
insofar as they were concluding a broader bargain on a new treaty ranging
across a number of topics. In those circumstances, Member States may feel
able to trade sensitivities about the concept of E.U. citizenship against
success in securing agreement with their partners to amend other provisions
of the E.U. Treaty framework. Article 22 provides, by its very nature, a
focused amendment procedure which would deprive the Member States of
the capacity to make such trade-offs across different political issues of
varying degrees of sensitivity.51  It is therefore rather hard to see the
circumstances in which it could ever be used in practice.
The Commission returned again to the question of national voting rights
for E.U. citizens in its communication evaluating the effects of the Tampere
Programme in the area of Justice and Home Affairs policy. 52 In its
communication, the Commission invited the Member States to open up a
dialogue in this area. This is an invitation which they failed to take up
when formulating the Hague Programme which followed on from the
Tampere Programme. Instead, the European Council declared that it
"encourages the Union's institutions, within the framework of their
competences, to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with
representative associations and civil society and to promote and facilitate
citizens' participation in public life."' 53 This vague statement hardly seems
to presage a collective major initiative from the Member States in this area,
and there is nothing in the practical program for action which refers to
electoral rights for nonnationals, even though article 22 refers to the
possibility of adopting an unspecified measure. 54 But, as we noted above, it
is not likely that the Member States will demonstrate the collective will at
present to adopt a measure under article 22.
Support for the proposal to extend electoral rights to national elections
has come from within the European Parliament. In a somewhat confused
and controversial report on the Commission's Fourth Report on Citizenship,
which was approved by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and
Home Affairs,5 5 several references were made to this question:
Schengen law within the domestic legal order, and its continued development, in which
Denmark has not participated.
51. EC Treaty art. 22.
52. Commission Communication: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment
of the Tampere Programme and Future Orientations, at 8, COM (2004) 401 final (June 2,
2004).
53. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, Annex 1, at 16 (Nov. 4/5,
2004).
54. Council and Commission Action Plan Implementing the Hague Programme on
Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, point 2.1(e), 2005 O.J.
(C 198) 1, 4.
55. Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the
Commission's Fourth Report on Citizenship of the Union (1 May 2001 - 30 April 2004), A6-
0411/2005 (Dec. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-
2005-0411 +O+DOC+PDF+VO//EN (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
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16. [The Parliament] [c]alls upon the Member States to discuss forthwith
the possibility of granting European citizens the right to vote and to stand
for election in municipal, local and regional elections of the Member State
in which they are resident, irrespective of nationality;
17. [And] [c]alls upon the Member States to discuss forthwith the
possibility of granting EU citizens the choice of voting and standing for
election in national elections either in the country in which they are
resident or in their country of origin (though not in both), irrespective of
nationality ... [.]56
Picking up a text contained in the earlier opinion given by the Committee
on Constitutional Affairs, the report goes on to suggest that
the conferring on European citizens who are not nationals of their
Member State of residence of the right to vote and to stand for election in
national and regional elections would make a tangible contribution to the
feeling of belonging to the European Union which is indispensable for
genuine EU citizenship. 57
Of course, it is not necessarily obvious why a citizen of one Member
State who is given additional rights of political participation in another
Member State where she is resident should feel more European in these
circumstances, as opposed to feeling more attached to the state (generously)
conferring these rights upon her. Perhaps the latter is a necessary
precondition for the former? In any event, the report as a whole was
rejected by the European Parliament in plenary in January 2006, largely
because it was opposed by the center-right majority party grouping of the
European People's Party-European Democrats, and thus this text should
be treated with caution as expressing at most the view of a particular
committee. 58
A more sophisticated link between European citizenship and electoral
rights for nonnationals in national elections is developed by Heather Lardy,
who argues for voting rights in national elections in terms of the link
between citizenship and self-government and democracy: "If citizens are
denied full voting rights, they are deprived of one of the most effective
mechanisms available to them for exerting political power." 59 Furthermore,
she adds that "[t]he denial of full voting rights to European Union citizens
effectively creates within each Member State two sub-groups of European
citizens: those who happen to be national citizens of that state, and those
who are not. Only the former group is granted the right to vote in national
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. In a vote held in plenary on January 17, 2006, the report was rejected by 276 votes in
favor to 347 against with 22 abstentions. European Parliament, Strasbourg Plenary: 16-19
January 2006, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/background-page/008-4356-019-
01-03-901-20060113BKG04268-19-01-2006-2006-false/defaulLpOO cO 8_en.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2007).




elections." 60 Against those who would argue that ascribing wider electoral
rights to E.U. citizens within the Member States would undermine national
sovereignty, she argues trenchantly that "[i]t should be remembered also
that the primary purpose of democratic principle is not to prescribe the
conditions which will protect national sovereignty, but to set out precepts
designed to further and sustain democratic government."' 61 In other words,
she invites us to look more critically at the relationship between the defense
of national sovereignty and the development of European citizenship as a
political and democratic project. Those seeking to defend national
sovereignty as they see it by excluding certain groups of residents from the
franchise should also have to justify the damage to democracy done by
excluding those residents in terms of limiting -the scope and compass of
democratic self-government. Lardy's argument is that having now breached
the boundary, which a traditionally exclusive conception of national
citizenship places around suffrage by introducing at least limited electoral
rights in the form of article 19 EC, the Member States consequently must
base any rejection of the argument for subsequently extending those rights
on something more than the defense of national sovereignty.
As noted above, the normative issue here is how to prevent the E.U. free
movement space from becoming a space of negative democratic impetus.
To put it another way, if the impulse of the E.U. treaties is positively to
encourage E.U. citizens to exercise their free movement rights, then how
are they to be protected against the negative consequences of moving
without acquiring the host state citizenship (such as the loss of the right to
vote in regional and national elections unless they are protected by
expatriate voting rights from their home state)? Furthermore, how are the
European Union and its Member States as a whole to be protected from
losing the democratic input of migrants into regional and national elections?
While this number is not necessarily huge at the present time, at around 1.5
percent, it is nevertheless the case that if the exercise of free movement
rights under E.U. law consistently coincides with the loss of democratic
participation rights, then this must have negative consequences for the
Member States as democratic polities. It is arguably wholly inconsistent for
the European Union and the Member States to preserve those participation
rights by means of nondiscrimination rights instituted at the E.U. level
under article 19 EC in relation to local and European electoral rights, while
ignoring the impact upon democratic participation in regional and national
elections.
III. DEVELOPING MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS
In sum, it seems plausible to argue not only that this is a live issue-as
demonstrated above-but also that so long as the European Union exists in
60. Id. at 626-27.
61. Id. at 632.
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its current form the issue is likely to become an ever more acute challenge
both to the European Union as an emergent polity and to the Member States
as more established polities. Consequently, it is useful to consider the
various mechanisms by which the Member States, separately or together, in
conjunction with the E.U. institutions or alone, might address this
challenge, even if the political omens regarding decisive action at the
present time are poor. The objective here is not to make a plea for one
particular outcome, such as a generalized extension of regional and national
electoral rights to E.U. citizens, but rather to illustrate the richness of the
legal instruments available to the Member States at the present time, and to
indicate how they might be developed in the future.
Under E.U. law as it stands, the Member States enjoy full and unlimited
discretion as to the groups upon which they confer the franchise in regional
and national elections, subject only to the strictures of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms such as article 3
of Protocol No. 1. This means an unlimited power to restrict the franchise
to national citizens alone, and an unfettered discretion as to whether, and
under what conditions, to grant to expatriates the right to vote in regional
and national elections and as to how to deal with issues of voter registration
and absentee ballots and postal voting. This is the status quo.
Clearly, if each and every mobile E.U. citizen became a citizen of the
Member State in which he or she resided, then there would be less
difficulty, although this would still not deal with issues raised by
differences of rules on expatriate and absentee voting. However,
citizenship acquisition is unlikely to be the answer. As things stand, a
resident nonnational E.U. citizen may be unable or unwilling to acquire the
nationality of the host Member State for one or more of the following
reasons:
" failure to satisfy a qualifying residence period;
" failure to satisfy probity or wealth tests (e.g., having minor criminal
offenses on the record which prevent citizenship acquisition);
" failure to satisfy other country-specific citizenship acquisition
conditions requiring applicants to pass language or cultural tests;
* unwillingness to state long-term future residence intentions because of
a future intention to migrate to a third state or to return to the home
state or to relinquish other nationalities (if dual nationality is not
tolerated).
There is presently nothing like a system of automatic or ascriptive
citizenship acquisition for resident nonnationals (without prejudice to home
state citizenship) in the E.U. Member States. Thus each and every national
of a Member State resident in another Member State would have to satisfy
whatever conditions on nationality acquisition are imposed by the host.
Professor Ruth Rubio-Marin argues in favor of a system of automatic or
ascriptive citizenship acquisition by resident nonnationals, making the
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argument precisely in order to find a normatively satisfactory method for
promoting democratic inclusion in the context of migration: She sees
"immigration as a democratic challenge." 62
In terms of what such a shift in approach might mean for the
development of a more intensive multilevel system of federal-type
citizenship in the Union, it is useful to make the comparison with the
United States. In combination with the gradual development and hardening
of a concept of national citizenship over many years, a matter on which the
original U.S. Constitution itself was remarkably silent,63 the United States
developed a form of state citizenship which linked to residence alone, rather
than any other marker of belonging. However, this was imposed from
above through the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause, which
provides that U.S. citizens are citizens of the state "in which they reside."64
It did not result from the separate or even collective decision of the states.
Such a decision would be required in the European Union at its present
stage of development. In the European Union, article 16 of the Citizens'
Rights Directive does at least (and-some might say-"finally") create a
status of permanent resident, which removes any further conditions upon
the right of residence of the Union citizen, thus potentially smoothing the
pathway for a Union citizen who does in fact seek naturalization in the host
state by providing a framework for establishing settled residence.65 It also
seeks to ensure that E.U. citizens are granted equal treatment with nationals
so far as pertains to any matter falling within the scope of E.U. law. But it
does not directly interfere with national citizenship status, or matters such
as electoral rights at the regional or national level. However, it is perhaps
arguable that the status of permanent residence should be regarded as a
form of "citizenship-of-residence-lite" for resident nonnational E.U.
citizens. In that case, could it be seen as a sufficient condition for the
granting of electoral rights to vote in regional and national elections in the
host state, as the next step towards integration?
Alternatively, we could shift the focus from looking at rights within the
host state, to consider the case for Member States to facilitate home state
voting for expatriates resident in other Member States. They could do this
without changing the rules on the right to vote simply by relaxing
registration arrangements to allow the loosest of connections with the home
state to suffice as the basis for registration in the former district of
residence. Alternatively, Member States could look more closely at
expatriate voting arrangements. In the latter case, this could be either with
specialist arrangements for direct representation of expatriates in the
62. Ruth Rubio-Marin, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and
Inclusion in Germany and the United States (2000).
63. Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History
115-28 (1997).
64. Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 195, 223
(2000).
65. See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 25.
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legislature (as in France and now, most recently and controversially, Italy,
where expatriates effectively decided the outcome of the 2006 general
election), or with participation of expatriate voters in the normal elections
of home-based representatives, as in the case of the United Kingdom (where
expatriate votes are reallocated back to the constituency where the
expatriate most recently resided). This may be hard to sustain in the longer
term, as indeed may the alternative of allowing flexible arrangements for
voter registration in their former domicile, as the connections between the
expatriate (and even potentially their children and grandchildren) and their
state of origin become ever looser. In turn, of course, that very looseness of
the connection undermines the case for arguing that expatriate voting is an
adequate form of democratic representation, since it can easily be argued
that the expatriate voter may always be a relatively disconnected and ill-
informed voter, and thus hardly one who adds to the democratic quality of
the electoral process.66
In any event, wherever there is a possibility that an expatriate E.U.
citizen resident in another Member State could have two votes (in the home
and the host state), the question arises as to the desirability and acceptability
of dual voting. Under the European Parliament Voting Rights Directive, 67
both dual voting and dual candidatures are emphatically ruled out. Article
4(1) provides that "[c]ommunity voters shall exercise their right to vote
either in the Member State of residence or in their home Member State. No
person may vote more than once at the same election. '68 It is of course
clearly wrong that any person should have two votes in a single election
(i.e., the European Parliament elections), albeit one that is still conducted
along essentially segmented national lines.69 However, it is not so clearly
problematic that a person should have two votes in separate regional or
national elections. Obviously, persons with dual nationality may already be
able to vote in general elections in two Member States, depending upon the
national rules in place. Interestingly, Maarten Vink comments upon a case
of trade-off within Dutch parliamentary politics, where the case for
extending electoral rights in national elections to nonnationals (building
upon the right to vote in local elections introduced in the 1980s) was traded
off in Parliament between the two governing parties, the Christian
Democrats (who were against) and the Social Democrats (who were in
favor) to produce an outcome which supported greater toleration of dual
nationality instead.70 This emphasizes the intimate link between policies on
expatriate voting and voting rights for nonnationals and citizenship policies.
66. See generally Claudio L6pez-Guerra, Should Expatriates Vote?, 13 J. Pol. Phil. 216
(2005).
67. Council Directive 93/109, supra note 18.
68. Id.
69. Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444 (Sept. 12,
2006) (acknowledging this point).




Under the current state of E.U. law and with the current state of
competences, any formal change to the rights and status of E.U. citizens
within the Member States will need to be driven forward by national action.
If this is to be the case, it does not necessarily mean that the European
Union will have no future role, but it remains to be established precisely
what that might be, and how the national action might impact upon the
evolution of the E.U. constitutional framework.
It goes without saying, of course, that the Member States could choose to
act together by changing the E.U. treaties to institute an equivalent to article
19 EC in the domain of regional and national elections and thus oblige
themselves to secure national implementation of the E.U. citizen's right to
equal treatment in relation to regional and national elections, just as they
did with local and European Parliamentary electoral rights. This would
require a formal extension of existing powers and competences either under
article 22 EC by way of a freestanding addition to the citizenship provisions
under this truncated amendment procedure (and initiating that process
would require an initiative from the Commission), or as part of a
generalized treaty amendment process. While I have already commented
about the unlikelihood in practice of the Council and the Commission
applying article 22, the latter proposal for generalized treaty amendment
also seems unlikely. In the wake of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty
to achieve ratification across the Member States in 2005 and 2006,
questions must be asked about whether any further treaty amendments are
conceivable in the short term. Moreover, even under more propitious
political circumstances than those prevailing in the mid-2000s, the need to
achieve unanimous agreement around a measure which would necessarily
involve an intrusion into national sovereign choices on the boundaries of
the suffrage would militate against such a major change in the scope of the
E.U. treaties.
Marginally more conceivable is a treaty provision which merely
encourages the Member States to adopt electoral rights in regional and
national elections. This could be along the lines of article 41 EC, which
states that "Member States shall, within the framework of a joint
programme, encourage the exchange of young workers." 71 Any such
reference to voting in regional or national elections in the Treaty, even if it
did not include a dispositive element such as that which can be found in
article 19 EC, would already open the way for the Commission to propose
various forms of action promoting convergence or benchmarking as
between the Member States in relation to electoral rights practices, so long
as such action fell short of proposing formal harmonization of national
laws. Even without such a reference, in the interests of promoting E.U.
citizenship, the Commission could doubtless already encourage forms of
soft law action on the part of the Member States such as, for example, a
Council Recommendation on electoral rights for E.U. citizens. These types
71. EC Treaty art. 41.
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of measures have been much used in recent years in the field of policy
making in relation to the integration of immigrants from third country
nationals, where such policy action lies at the margins of the EU's formal
competences. 72 There have even been references in some, but not all,
documents on integration to encouraging the Member States to institute
local electoral rights for all immigrants. 73  However, such measures
categorically do not impose enforceable obligations upon the Member
States.
An alternative way forward could be to use a mechanism of international
law outside the formal legal framework of the E.U. treaties, which would
have the advantage of providing a flexible structure into which the Member
States could opt, as politics and circumstances dictated. Using the
mechanisms of international law to promote flexible policy making in the
European Union is a form of "old-fashioned" flexibility, not least because
this mechanism has always existed and makes use of the external resources
of international law, and in particular the principle of reciprocity of
obligations.74  Thus, instead of just adopting recommendations or
guidelines which the Member States take little notice of, and which it
cannot formally enforce, the Commission could try to encourage the
Member States to follow the line at least some of them took with the
Schengen Agreements in the 1980s and 1990s. The Schengen Agreements
were intended to lead to the gradual abolition on border checks on persons
moving between the Member States, along with the installation of a
common approach at the external frontiers (e.g., the Schengen Visa). It was
a laboratory of integration, and it led in the longer term to a substantial
extension of the scope of the E.U. treaties in 1999, with the incorporation of
Schengen into the E.U. system through the Treaty of Amsterdam.
To put it another way, by analogy with the Schengen experiment, some
or all of the Member States could explore the possibilities for further
integration in the field of political rights for citizens offered by an
international agreement developed outside the framework of the European
Union, without prejudice to the possibilities of future Union action or
Union competences in the field. Such a convention negotiated between the
Member States could lay down a consensual framework for reciprocal
recognition of voting rights in regional and national elections to
nonnationals on a bilateral and possibly multilateral basis. It might also
provide a roadmap to achieving mutual recognition in this field, and thus
encourage the development of the requisite trust and common action
72. Shaw, supra note *, ch. 7.
73. See, e.g., Draft Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States on the establishment of Common Basic Principles for
immigrant integration policy in the European Union, 14776/04 MIGR 105, Principle 9 (Nov.
18, 2004).
74. Bruno de Witte, Old-fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements Between
Member States of the European Union, in Constitutional Change in the EU: From
Uniformity to Flexibility? 31 (Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000).
2007] 2567
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
between the Member States needed for developments to occur in this area.
The Convention could be developed such that it would come into force as
soon as a minimum of two Member States had formally signed and ratified
it, thus creating a framework which all of the states, if they so wished, could
gradually opt into as they developed bilateral and multilateral arrangements
with their partners within the Union. The level of detail in the convention
should at the minimum cover the issues relating to registration and mutual
recognition covered in the two electoral rights directives of 1993 and
1994.75
It may be objected that there already exist many international instruments
in the field of political rights, including ones which are much less far-
reaching in nature, such as the Council of Europe Convention on the
Political Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level. 76 Yet the
majority of the Member States have declined to adopt and ratify such
modest instruments. Why should they proceed with a more ambitious
agreement along the lines suggested? The reply to this objection would
presumably point to the incentives of the Member States resulting from an
agreement which would be clearly reciprocal in nature, offering the
possibility for Member States creating bilateral or possibly multilateral
arrangements of reciprocity in the first instance with close neighbors or
states with which they had an existing affiliation. It could reasonably be
expected that there may be genuine pressure for such developments from
their respective citizens (e.g., Portugal/Spain, Germany/France,
Sweden/Finland/Denmark, Czech/Slovak Republics, Baltic states, Benelux
and so on). Only after trust has been built up in the context of such
relationships might Member States move on towards generalizing the
ascription of voting rights in regional and national elections to all resident
E.U. citizens. The downside of such alliances, of course, could be the
increasing fragmentation of E.U. law, and the danger that some European
citizens may find themselves excluded from access to what is regarded as
the "gold standard" of political rights (i.e., the right to vote in national
elections), just because the Member State where they reside and the one of
which they hold the national citizenship do not belong to the same alliance.
IV. BUILDING ON THE STATUS Quo: THE NATIONAL ACQUIS
One clear advantage of this manner of proceeding, which stresses
reciprocity, is that it could build in interesting ways upon the few examples
of the ascription of voting rights to nonnationals in regional and national
elections within the Member States of the European Union at the present
time. The United Kingdom is the most substantial case, giving rights to
Irish citizens, and to Cypriot and Maltese citizens as Commonwealth
75. See supra note 18.
76. Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level, opened
for signature Feb. 5, 1992, Europ. T.S. No. 144 (entered into force May 1, 1997).
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citizens, to vote in all U.K. elections, 77 subject only to satisfactory
immigration status.78 They may also stand for election, but again subject to
satisfactory immigration status. 79 The franchise for Irish citizens and
Commonwealth citizens is a legacy of the British Empire and the slow
emergence of a concept of "citizenship" as opposed to "subjecthood" (to the
Crown) in the United Kingdom.80 In that sense, neither Irish citizens nor
Commonwealth citizens were treated as "aliens," that is as persons whose
influence on domestic politics should be prevented as a matter of principle
because of the imputation of some potential malign influence.
From time to time the case for extending the suffrage is canvassed in the
U.K. Parliament. The views of the various political parties presented in a
1998 Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons Report on
Electoral Law and Administration give a flavor of the range of views, and
how these map onto the political landscape:
[I]t has been suggested that the right to vote in parliamentary elections
could be extended to all EU citizens or, further still, that the right to vote
in all elections could be given to all foreign residents after they had been
in this country for a set period of time. The representatives of the political
parties were not at one on this point, with Lord Parkinson for the
Conservatives reluctant to extend the current exceptions, Mr Gardner for
Labour recognising there might be a case-particularly on the basis of
reciprocity-for some extension, and Mr Rennard for the Liberal
Democrats suggesting that the present distinctions were artificial and that
77. The Representation of the People Act, 1918, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64 (U.K.), established
the first truly modem franchise for the U.K. Westminster Parliament, abolishing property
qualifications for men and introducing the franchise for (some) women for the first time. At
the time it posited the franchise for "British subjects," and when Ireland and what are now
the countries of the Commonwealth became independent states, the franchise arrangements
were preserved and updated, for example, in the Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c.
41 (U.K.). The relevant consolidating legislation laying down the general entitlement to vote
is the Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2 (U.K.), as amended. For a review of the
current scope of the franchise, see Chris Sear, Electoral Franchise: Who Can Vote? (House
of Commons Library Standard Note SN/PC/2208, March 1, 2005).
78. Oonagh Gay, The Franchise and Immigration Status (House of Commons Library
Standard Note SN/PC/419, Oct. 11, 2005). There is now a requirement that to be registered
a person must have leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom. Representation of the
People Act, 1983, §§ 1, 2, 4 (U.K.), substituted by Representation of the People Act, 2000, c.
2, § 1 (U.K.). Such a person is a "Qualifying Commonwealth Citizen."
79. The Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.), prescribes the basic
contours of the right to stand for election in the United Kingdom, although its requirement
that a person be born in England, Scotland, or Ireland or one of the dominions thereto in
order to stand for election does not apply to Irish and Commonwealth citizens. See Isobel
White, Oonagh Gay, Richard Kelly, & Ross Young, The Electoral Administration Bill 2005-
06, at 74 (House of Commons Library Research Paper No. 05/65, Oct. 2005). However,
until the adoption of the Electoral Administration Act, 2006, c. 22, § 18 (U.K.), the
immigration status of the candidates had not been dealt with in like manner to the
immigration status of nonnational voters.
80. In Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 444, 79
(Sept. 12, 2006), the court recognized this position as one of the constitutional traditions of
the United Kingdom, and, as such, as a position which deserved protection within the
framework of Community law so far as possible.
2007] 2569
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
prima facie those who were resident here and paying taxes should have
some form of right to vote .... [W]e do not think the present voting
entitlements for non-UK citizens need extension.8 1
From the U.K. perspective, the franchise for E.U. citizens is already
wider than in other Member States, since the United Kingdom allows E.U.
citizens to vote in the elections for the devolved Parliaments and
Assemblies of the component nations of the United Kingdom, and in the
elections for the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. Technically
this is because such elections are governed within a framework analogous
to local elections for the purposes of the franchise and so the right to vote
flows naturally from that conclusion.82 The use of the local electoral
register might seem anomalous in some respects since these bodies may
have "legislative competence 83 or the power to make acts of Parliament. 84
But the choice for the local electoral register may reflect both the need to
simplify electoral administration by not creating a new register of electors
just for these purposes, and/or the need to emphasize the local character of
the devolved functions, in a manner which tends to conceal the emerging
federal character of the United Kingdom's territorial and governance
settlement.
Moreover, E.U. citizens were able to vote in the regionally based
referendums in Scotland and Wales held to ascertain whether the people of
these "region-nations" wanted new forms of representation or political
authority, and they have had the right to vote in every other referendum
held since 1997 (e.g., the one held in London to decide whether to have a
Mayor of London and a London Assembly) apart from the one held on the
establishment of devolved institutions in Northern Ireland.85 The degree of
openness to this question in the United Kingdom is further illustrated by the
fact that prior to the publication of the draft E.U. bill, which if passed
would have provided for the United Kingdom's referendum on the
Constitutional Treaty, there was some speculation in political circles about
whether the government would propose extending the franchise to E.U.
81. Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons, Report on Electoral Law
and Administration, 1997-8, H.C. 768-I, 118.
82. Local Government Elections (Changes to the Franchise and Qualification of
Members) Regulations, 1995, S.I. 1995/1948, § 3(1) (U.K.), provides the basic amendments
to the local electorate to incorporate the requirements of E.U. law. In relation to the
inclusion of E.U. citizens in the "regional" franchise, see Greater London Authority Act,
1999, c. 29, § 17 (U.K.); Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 11 (U.K.); Government of Wales Act,
2006, c. 32, § 12 (U.K.); Northern Ireland (Elections) Act, 1998, c. 12, § 2(2) (U.K.)
(repealed Dec. 2, 1999).
83. Government of Wales Act, 2006, § 94.
84. Scotland Act, 1998, § 28.
85. Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act, 1997, c. 61, §§ 1(2), 2(2) (U.K.). The
parliamentary electoral register was used to determine the franchise in the Northern Ireland
referendum, doubtless given the sensitivities of the issues attaching to this referendum,
which followed on from the Belfast Agreement of Easter 1998. See generally Oonagh Gay,
The Franchise for Referendums (House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/PC/25 83,
Aug. 18, 2003).
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citizens resident in the United Kingdom. 86 However, in the event the bill
proposed that the franchise should be based on that for general elections in
the United Kingdom, and thus included only Irish, Cypriot, and Maltese
citizens resident in the United Kingdom. Since Irish citizens would not
have had an expatriate electoral right in relation to voting in any Irish
referendum, they would not have enjoyed double representation.
Ireland is the only other E.U. Member State which gives rights to vote in
national elections to nationals of another E.U. Member State. 87 It gives the
right to vote, but not stand, in Ddil elections to U.K. citizens alone. It does
not give U.K. citizens the right to vote in referendums or presidential
elections.
The text of the ninth amendment to the Bunreacht na htireann (Irish
Constitution), which was passed by referendum in 1984, gives a general
power to the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) to legislate to extend rights to
vote in D&il elections to noncitizens. These provisions were only
introduced after a case had been brought before the Irish Supreme Court
which contested a 1983 bill which would have originally extended the
franchise to U.K. citizens not only to vote in Ddil elections, but also in
elections for the President and in referendums. 88 This bill was intended to
extend the existing legal position which already gave U.K. citizens the right
to vote in local elections (along with all other resident nonnationals) and in
European Parliament elections (in the latter case, of course, in advance of
introduction of article 19 EC). A primary motivation for the 1983 bill was
to introduce some element of reciprocity in relation to the electoral rights
granted under U.K. law to Irish citizens.
In finding that the 1983 bill violated the constitution as it stood, the
supreme court concluded that article 16 of the Irish constitution, in the form
in which it then existed, provided a complete code limiting the electorate
for the Ddcil elections to Irish citizens, and Irish citizens alone. There could
be no possibility of extending by ordinary legislation the franchise to other
86. Conspiracy theorists suggested that the Labour Government of Prime Minister Tony
Blair might try to extend the franchise in this way to increase the chances of a "yes" vote in
the referendum, on the (perhaps misplaced) assumption that E.U. citizens from other
Member States resident in the United Kingdom might be more likely to vote "yes." The
possible options for the franchise (local or national) are canvassed in Oonagh Gay,
Proposals for a Referendum on the New European Constitution (House of Commons Library
Standard Note SN/PC 3064, May 27, 2004).
87. Ireland also grants electoral rights to all nonnationals in local elections (voting and
standing), and has done so since 1972. Electoral Act, 1992, § 10 (Act No. 23/1992) (Ir.)
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992_23.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
88. In re Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of The Electoral (Amendment)
Bill, 1983 [SC No 373 of 1983] [1984] I.R. 268 (Ir.). U.K. citizens continue to be excluded
from voting in presidential elections and referendums. These are powers reserved under the
constitution to citizens alone, by interpretation of article 6 of the constitution. Ir. Const.,
1937, art. 6, available at
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached files/Pdft/20files/Constitution%20oto/20lrelandNov2
004.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
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groups of electors, as had been contended by the Attorney General, 89 who
was tasked with arguing the case for a bill which had been piloted through
Parliament by the Fine Gael/Labour coalition government before being
challenged before the supreme court. The supreme court based its argument
on a conception of the national suffrage oriented around a concept of
national popular sovereignty. It found that this conception of sovereignty
underpins the Irish constitution:
Article 6 [of the Constitution] proclaims that all powers of government
derive under God from the people and, further, that it is the people's right
to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all
questions of national policy. There can be little doubt that "the people"
here referred to are the people of Ireland by, and for, whom the
Constitution was enacted. In short, this Article proclaims that it is the
Irish people who are the rulers of Ireland and that from them, under God,
all powers of government derive and that by them the rulers are
designated and national policy decided. It is not possible to regard this
Article as contemplating the sharing of such powers with persons who do
not come within the constitutional concept of the Irish people in Article
6.90
The court went on to distinguish between a provision regarding the basic
political organization of the state, such as article 16 on the suffrage, and
provisions on fundamental rights such as freedom of association and
expression, granted ostensibly under the constitution to citizens alone, but
which the Irish courts had also interpreted in certain circumstances as
protecting the rights of noncitizens. Consequently, article 16 was
interpreted as providing an exhaustive definition of the suffrage, which
meant that the introduction of electoral rights for U.K. citizens (and any
other noncitizens) would require a constitutional amendment.
After the referendum passing the ninth amendment to the constitution,
the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1985, was passed amending the suffrage
for D&il elections to cover British citizens, and to create a power for a
minister to extend this on the basis of reciprocity in the event that other
E.U. Member States confer the right to vote in their parliamentary elections
on Irish citizens. Thus,
(1 B) Where the Minister is of opinion that-
(a) the law of a Member State relating to the election of members of, or
deputies or other representatives in or to, the National Parliament of that
Member State enables citizens of Ireland, by reason of their being such
citizens and being resident in that Member State, to vote at such an
election, and
89. It is interesting to note that the Attorney General of Ireland at the time was Peter
Sutherland, later to become a member of the European Commission and, later still, Director
General of the WTO. Throughout, Sutherland has been an important proponent of closer
European integration.
90. In re Article 26, [1984] I.R. at 268.
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(b) the provisions of that law enabling citizens of Ireland who are so
resident so to vote are the same, or are substantially the same, as those
enabling nationals of that Member State so to vote,
the Minister may by order declare that Member State to be a Member
State [whose citizens may vote in Ddil elections]. 9 1
This is an interesting development on two counts. First, because while
the political act of extending the suffrage to U.K. citizens can be regarded
as recognizing the historical connection between, and the overlapping
citizenships of, the two states of the United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as
the rights granted by the United Kingdom to Irish citizens, 92 only the
condition of reciprocity is applied for the future to other E.U. Member
States. The second curiosity is that it requires only a ministerial order to
extend the suffrage beyond its current boundaries, the relevant
parliamentary consent having already been given.
As it stands, with the reciprocity requirement in what is now section 8(3)
of the Electoral Act, 1992, the trigger for action must in principle come
from another Member State, or from common action amongst the Member
States. As the Minister for the Public Service, Mr. Boland, stated, during
debates in the Irish Parliament,
[I]t seems appropriate to look forward to the day when member states will
be prepared to confer on each other's citizens the right to vote at
parliamentary elections. [The Irish Government] would welcome this
development and, in anticipation of it, this Bill proposes to enable the
Minister by order to extend the Ddil vote on a reciprocal basis to nationals
of other member states.93
While the issue of extending electoral rights to E.U. citizens has not
recently been actively debated in Irish politics, it is supported within a
number of opposition parties, notably Sinn Fain and the Labour Party, even
91. Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1985, § 2(IB) (Act No. 12/1985) (Ir.) (inserting a new
§ IB into §5 of the Electoral Act, 1963 (Act No. 19/1963) (Ir.)). These provisions are now
encoded at Electoral Act, 1992, §§ 8(2)-(7) (Act No. 23/1992) (Ir.).
92. Introducing the original Electoral (Amendment) Bill 1983 into the Ddil, the Minister
stated that
[t]he aim of this Bill is to give a further measure of practical expression to what
has been referred to as the unique relationship which exists between this country
and our nearest neighbour, and to acknowledge and reciprocate the voting rights
enjoyed by Irish citizens in Britain. It is my hope that measures such as this,
reflecting close ties between neighbouring peoples, will make their contribution to
promoting peace and reconciliation throughout these islands.
345 Ddil Deb. col. 251 (Oct. 19, 1983). The case for excluding British citizens from the
right to vote in presidential elections, Seanad Aireann (upper house) elections, and
referendums was highlighted by the speaker from Fianna Fil, Bobby Molloy TD, precisely
because there cannot be reciprocity in the United Kingdom with a nonelected Head of State
and Upper House, and (at that time) no tradition of referendums. 345 Ddil Deb. col. 253
(Oct. 19, 1983). As was noted in the text accompanying supra note 86, the franchise for the
U.K. Referendum on the Constitutional Treaty would have included all those entitled to vote
in general elections in the United Kingdom, including Irish citizens.
93. 108 Seanad Deb. col. 1193 (June 27, 1985).
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as an issue which should be taken up unilaterally by Ireland, in the absence
of common action amongst the Member States. 94
What the combined examples of the existing franchises in the United
Kingdom and Ireland show is that there are many conceivable routes within
political argument towards the extension of the franchise in national
elections to resident nonnational E.U. citizens. In Ireland, a mechanism
such as an international agreement between the Member States could be a
trigger to developing the reciprocity necessary for extending the existing
scope of the franchise within the confines of the existing legislation.
However, Ireland, like all the Member States, could apply a "pick and
choose" approach to its fellow Member States in relation to the electoral
rights granted. It could be argued that such a "pick and choose" approach
imports too great an element of flexibility into the system of integration
which links the Member States. There may be some force in this objection
given that the thrust of European integration for the most part has been
towards identifying collective goals for the Member States and then finding
the means by which these can be achieved, through as much collective
action as possible. However, there are already substantial elements of
flexibility built into the system of E.U. law as it stands. Opt-outs are
available for states from monetary union and from the Schengen system
governing the borders, and thus adding one more element to the system of
flexible integration packages does not seem wholly problematic. This
argument is particularly powerful if-in comparison to the situation as it
stands at present-such a system would lead to an incremental accretion of
rights accruing to E.U. citizens, albeit through the medium of national law
but triggered by the reciprocity mechanisms of international law.
In the United Kingdom, it would represent a very few steps from
acknowledging that the degree of integration of and trust in resident
nonnational E.U. citizens, which makes them part of the electorate for
elections to the devolved authorities of the non-English parts of the United
Kingdom, to acknowledging that the same principles of integration and trust
should also mandate the possibility that an E.U. citizen, perhaps having
served a qualifying residence period, should be able to participate in
Westminster elections as well as elections to institutions based in
Edinburgh, Cardiff, or Belfast. This argument might particularly be made
in respect of E.U. citizens resident in England (with the exception of those
in London who can vote for the Mayor of London and the London
Assembly), who do not currently enjoy the opportunities for democratic
participation given to their E.U. citizen peers in Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland to vote for the authorities that hold powers in fields such
94. Interviews with TDs (Irish MPs) representing Sinn Fdin and the Labour Party, at the
Irish Parliament (Mar. 3, 2005). A TD representing the Green Party was broadly supportive
of the suggestion in the light of wider Green Party policy, some of which is highly critical of
developments within the European Union notably in the defense field, but a Senator from the
Progressive Democrats, the junior coalition partner of the Fianna Fil government was
much more skeptical.
2574 (Vol. 75
E. U. CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
as education, agriculture, transport, and health, and in the case of the
Scottish Parliament, at least, the power to make primary legislation. In any
event, the existing anomalies in relation to the United Kingdom's
asymmetric federal arrangements are enhanced by the differences in the
franchise between these two types of elections, and any attempt to review
the United Kingdom's current constitutional settlement should surely take
that question into account. 95 As in Ireland, a convention mechanism could
create the institutional structure in which the necessary trust and reciprocity
between the Member States could gradually be seeded and develop.
One final note of caution needs to be sounded, however, and this
concerns possible constitutional obstacles at the national level which may
be faced by this type of innovation in the broad context of European
integration. While the United Kingdom clearly sees no constitutional
obstacle to including nonnationals within the franchise for the purposes of
national elections-since it already allows Irish and Commonwealth
citizens to vote and stand in Westminster elections, and since Ireland has
already successfully amended its constitution to make it possible in practice
to enfranchise nonnational E.U. citizens-it can be assumed that these two
states would not encounter a significant difficulty with the type of proposal
set out here. However, if Ireland were to go beyond what has already been
established in order to enshrine, for example, a right to stand for election, or
the right to vote in presidential elections or referendums, it would
undoubtedly require a further amendment to the constitution. Equally, it
can be assumed that constitutional changes would be required in most if not
all of the other Member States. There is no doubt that the right to vote in
regional and national elections cuts closer to the heart of national
sovereignty than does the right to vote in local elections, and establishing
the latter set of electoral rights at the national level already required
constitutional adjustments to be made in many Member States consequent
upon the Treaty of Maastricht.96
There may in some cases be a further problem beyond the feasibility and
political possibility of such a sensitive constitutional amendment, and that
concerns its very possibility in constitutional terms, given that it would be
proposed to include nonnationals within the group of persons tasked with
electing the sovereign legislature. Notwithstanding the powerful normative
arguments that can be made in favor of a more inclusionary conception of
the demos,97 or indeed the instrumental arguments about E.U. citizenship
made earlier in this paper, it may simply be legally impossible for the
national constitutions of some Member States to be amended to allow for
95. See Shaw, supra note *, ch. 8, for a further discussion of voting in regional elections.
96. Siofra O'Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free
Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship 218 (1996); Peter Oliver, Electoral Rights under
Article 8B of the Treaty of Rome, 33 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 473, 476-78 (1996).
97. William A. Barbieri, Jr., Ethics of Citizenship: Immigration and Group Rights in
Germany (1998); Heather Lardy, Citizenship and the right to vote, 17 O.J.L.S. 75 (1997);
Lardy, supra note 59.
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nonnational E.U. citizens to vote in regional and national elections. To do
so would violate their fundamental self-conceptions as nation states, where
power flows from the "people," and the "people" are the national citizens,
bound together in a community. In 1990 the German Federal Constitutional
Court annulled Land level legislation put forward by Hamburg and
Schleswig-Holstein to introduce electoral rights for nonnationals at the local
level for nonnationals. 98 In ruling that the proposed legislative schemes
breached the German Basic Law, the court relied upon a concept of popular
sovereignty as the basis for political legitimacy, and linked this to a
principle of a bounded Staatsvolk (or "state people"), limited by reference
to the holding of national citizenship. It explicitly rejected the principle of
affected interests as the basis for a claim to political equality and access to
the franchise. The key phrase reads,
[The principle of popular sovereignty] in Article 20(2) of the Basic Law
does not mean that the decisions engaging state authority must be
legitimated by those who are affected by them; rather state authority must
be based on a people understood as a group of persons bound together as
a unity.99
It extended its conclusion about "state" authority also to the level of local
democracy, holding that municipalities, like the elected authorities at the
state and federal level, wield state power. Not only did this rule out the
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein initiatives, but it also meant that the
implementation of article 19 EC subsequently required an amendment to
article 28 of the Basic Law.
Extrapolating from those rulings to the question as to whether a
constitutional amendment would be possible to give nonnational E.U.
citizens the right to vote in German national or indeed Ldnder elections
raises some obvious problems. The Federal Constitutional Court
demonstrates a clear constitutional preference for a bounded concept of the
demos calculated by reference to the limits of formal legal nationality, with
some indications in the text that it has a preference for a concept of national
legal community that involves strong societal bonds (of language, culture,
and so on). This goes to the untouchable core of the German constitutional
framework. The Staat, which is the basis for calculating the Staatsvolk is
defined in the Basic Law as a democratic, federal, and social state based on
98. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 31, 1990,
83 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 37 (F.R.G.) (Schleswig-
Holstein); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 31, 1990,
83 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 60 (F.R.G.) (Hamburg). For
detailed commentary, see Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and
Citizens 71-128 (2004); Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State: The United
States, Germany, and Great Britain 104-19 (1999); Rubio-Marin, supra note 62, at 186-234;
Shaw, supra note *, ch. 9; Olivier B1aud, Le droit de vote des 6trangers: l'apport de la
jurisprudence constitutionnelle allemande d une thdorie du droit de suffrage, 8 Revue
Franqaise de Droit Administratif 409 (1992); Gerald L. Neuman, "We are the People":
Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. 259 (1992).
99. 83 BVerfGE 37 (50) (my translation).
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the rule of law. In addition, the court seems to indicate its support for the
principle that there can be no democracy without a demos, a legally defined
group which in turn wields state power. 100 Even in the liberal and
increasingly pluralistic society which Germany is today, one does not need
to deploy an ethno-cultural reading of the concept of Volk in the German
Basic Law for it to be possible to envisage difficulties with an attempt to
amend the text to allow nonnationals to wield state power due to the tight
conception of political responsibility which the court gave in the 1990
judgments. In its rulings, the court did explicitly recognize the possibility
of E.U. citizens being given the right to vote in the future in local elections,
as this was already under discussion at the time, in 1990. But this did
require an amendment to article 28 of the Basic Law, which was introduced
as part of the package of measures designed to give effect to the Treaty of
Maastricht. It remains, however, a moot point in German constitutional law
whether the Basic Law could be stretched to accommodate rights for
nonnational E.U. citizens to vote in either regional or national elections.
CONCLUSIONS: ELECTORAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
This essay has used the issue of whether mobile E.U. citizens should be
granted the right to vote in the regional and national elections of the
Member State in which they reside as a case study showing how the
constitutionalization processes of the European Union are not (and should
not be) necessarily confined to the European Union level alone. The
European Union is a complex system of multilevel governance, in which
detailed interconnections with the legal and constitutional orders of the
European Union and its Member States (and of the Member States inter se)
are an integral component of the overall structure and are as important in
their own way as the E.U. treaties themselves or the case law of the Court
of Justice. These interconnections would have been sustained, and indeed
in some ways developed, had the EU's Constitutional Treaty been ratified
and entered into force, as scheduled, on November 1, 2006. However, the
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in two decisive referendums held in
France and the Netherlands in mid-2005 effectively froze the ratification
process, and it seems very unlikely that the Constitutional Treaty will enter
into force in its current form. However, in the absence of decisive treaty-
based reform, the EU's underlying composite constitutional framework will
continue to develop incrementally, including in the sphere of citizenship.
This case study has illustrated both the possibilities for further
development of the political dimension of E.U. citizenship through the type
of semi-coordinated trust building advocated in Part II in the form of a
convention providing a framework for the reciprocal allocation of electoral
rights to resident E.U. citizens, and also-in the latter part of Part III-
100. See Rubio-Marin, supra note 62, at 205.
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some of the limitations of such an approach. For, at a certain point, in
every sphere, including that of the franchise, the constitution-building
process of a limited polity such as the European Union will run up against
the "rock" of national sovereignty. There may be, as the German case
briefly demonstrates, some conceptions of national political sovereignty,
which place a claim to exclusive ownership of the concept of demos, that
even the most skilled and subtle constitutional drafting cannot get around.
However, even limiting the discussion to that which is legally possible, and
arguably politically desirable, there remains considerable space to develop
the political dimension of E.U. citizenship further than it has hitherto been
taken.
